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ARTICLE 
NML Capital v. Argentina:  
Enforcing Contracts in the Shadow 
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
 
MATTHEW D. MCGILL AND ALEXANDER N. HARRIS
†  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Argentina’s 2001 decision to stop paying on tens of billions of 
dollars of debt held by private and public creditors set off the largest 
sovereign default in history to that point.1  In the thirteen years since 
Argentina stopped paying on its private debt, creditors have made 
numerous attempts to recover what they are owed.  Yet, in spite of an 
economic recovery that could have enabled Argentina to satisfy its 
obligations and thereby return to the international financial markets, 
Argentina instead steadfastly has refused to pay holdout creditors and 
resisted those creditors’ legal efforts to collect what Argentina owes 
them.  Although Argentina granted a broad waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the defaulted bonds in dispute, it routinely has invoked 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act2 in opposition to those efforts. 
 
 †  Matthew D. McGill is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher LLP.  He graduated from Dartmouth College in 1996, and from 
Stanford Law School in 2000.  Alexander N. Harris is an associate in the San 
Francisco office of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP.  He graduated from Harvard 
College in 2008 and from Stanford Law School in 2011.  Together, they represent 
NML Capital, Ltd., one of the plaintiff creditors in the cases discussed here. 
 1. See Shane Roming, Argentina’s Long History of Economic Booms and 
Busts, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (Jul. 30, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/mo
neybeat/2014/07/30/argentinas-long-history-of-economic-booms-and-busts. 
 2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, et seq. (2012). 
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On June 16, 2014, the Supreme Court rejected two such 
attempts.  In a merits decision, Republic of Argentina v. NML 
Capital, Ltd. (the “Discovery Case”),3 the Court held that the FSIA 
imposes only the limits set forth in the statute; because the statute 
does not speak to discovery about assets potentially available to 
satisfy a judgment against the sovereign, it does not limit such 
discovery efforts.  On the same day, the Court declined to review a 
closely watched injunction that specifically enforced a promise 
Argentina had made in its defaulted bonds to accord its “payment 
obligations” under those bonds equal treatment with its payment 
obligations under other bonds (the “Equal Treatment Case”).4  
Although the Supreme Court did not explain its reasons for denying 
certiorari, as is customary, the reasoning of the Court’s decision in 
the Discovery Case left the Court with little to review in the Equal 
Treatment Case.  As the Court explained in the Discovery Case, the 
FSIA limits the authority of federal courts only to the extent set forth 
explicitly in the statute, and because the FSIA does not impose any 
limits on in personam injunctions, but rather provides that a properly 
sued “foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances,”5 the Act 
cannot be read to prohibit the specific performance order its creditors 
obtained. 
This is precisely as Congress intended.  The FSIA replaced the 
prior practice of sovereign immunity—which either provided 
“absolute” immunity for foreign governments or permitted the 
executive branch to make case-by-case determinations—with a 
codified, judicially administered and enforced list of specific 
immunities.6  By making immunity determinations more predictable, 
the FSIA allows the United States to serve as a financial market to 
the world, where investors can make contracts knowing that they will 
be honored under law.  The ability to sign agreements that will be 
enforced benefits sovereigns, especially those whose volatile histories 
make creditors wary of lending money secured only by the 
sovereign’s promise.  Not all sovereigns will sign contracts as 
protective of creditors’ rights as those Argentina issued, but those 
that do so can expect to have their commitments enforced, thanks to 
 
 3. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. (Discovery Case), 134 S. Ct. 
2250 (2014). 
 4. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. (Equal Treatment Case III), 
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014), denying cert. to 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012). 
 6. See Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2255–56 (recounting the prior immunity 
determination practice and its displacement with the FSIA). 
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the Supreme Court’s recent rulings. 
II. ARGENTINA’S DEFAULT AND SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION 
Argentina has a long “history of defaulting on, or requiring 
restructuring of, its sovereign obligations.”7  In 1994, Argentina 
attempted to persuade investors wary of its tumultuous past to 
purchase new bonds.  Argentina wrote into the Fiscal Agency 
Agreement governing these bonds8 several protections: Argentina 
waived sovereign immunity;9 provided that the contract would be 
governed by New York law;10 consented to jurisdiction in the federal 
or state courts in New York City;11 and, in an clause now known as 
the Equal Treatment Provision,12 promised that it would “rank” the 
“payment obligations” under those bonds “at least equally with all its 
other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External 
Indebtedness.”13  “External Indebtedness,” in turn, was defined as 
debt offered in whole or in part outside of Argentina in non-
Argentine currency.14  On the strength of these promises, investors 
bought billions of dollars of Argentina’s bonds. 
Just seven years later, Argentina defaulted.15  It declared a 
“moratorium” on paying its debts, which it has renewed since then.16  
When Argentina’s economy recovered, rather than lift the 
moratorium, in 2005, it made a unilateral offer to exchange defaulted 
bonds for new bonds with materially different terms that were worth 
roughly 25 cents on the dollar.17  To coerce investors to accept this 
offer, Argentina promised that, apart from this bond swap, its 
defaulted debts never would be repaid.  This threat took several 
 
 7. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 8. Fiscal Agency Agreement Between The Republic of Argentina and Bankers 
Trust Company, Fiscal Agent, available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files 
/Services/Argentine-Sovereign-Debt/2013/FiscalAgencyAgreementOct191994.pdf. 
 9. Id. at A-17. 
 10. Id. at 30. 
 11. Id. at 29. 
 12. The Equal Treatment Provision in Argentina’s Fiscal Agency Agreement 
has also been called a “Pari Passu Clause,” but its terms offer substantially 
different—and greater—protections than many other “pari passu clauses.” See 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case I), 699 F.3d 
246, 251, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 13. Fiscal Agency Agreement, supra note 8, at 2. 
 14. Id. at 16. 
 15. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 251. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 252. 
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forms:  Argentina told investors that “it has no intention of resuming 
payment” on defaulted bonds; it informed the SEC that “it has 
classified unexchanged FAA Bonds as a category separate from its 
regular debt;” and it passed a law, known as the Lock Law, 
preventing the Argentine executive from making payments on the 
defaulted debt, or otherwise settling the debt.18  Argentina briefly 
suspended this Lock Law in 2010 to permit a second swap of the 
defaulted debt, this one on terms even less favorable than those 
offered in 2005, before it once again forbade itself from repaying the 
creditors holding its defaulted bonds.19  Since 2005, Argentina has 
been timely paying on all of the bonds issued in these exchanges—at 
least it had been until the injunction, discussed below, took effect—
without paying a penny on the defaulted bonds.20 
To attempt to recover on their defaulted bonds, plaintiffs 
(including our client, NML Capital, Ltd.), pursued several strategies.  
Plaintiffs have scoured the globe in search of assets of Argentina that 
could be seized to satisfy their money judgments issued by the 
district courts.  In furtherance of this strategy, NML served 
subpoenas on certain banks seeking information concerning property 
belonging to Argentina, or to its agencies or instrumentalities, and 
their financial transactions.21  The district court enforced the 
subpoenas, and Argentina—not the banks subject to the subpoenas—
appealed, arguing that the FSIA barred the discovery request because 
it might reach assets that would be immune under the FSIA or located 
outside the United States.22  In the Supreme Court, Argentina was 
joined in this argument by the United States, which participated as 
amicus curiae.23 
Meanwhile, as it waged its fight over post-judgment asset 
discovery, NML opened a second front with an action to enforce its 
separate rights under the Equal Treatment Provision on bonds on 
 
 18. Id. at 252–54. 
 19. Id. at 252–53. 
 20. Id. at 253. 
 21. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2253. 
 22. See Corrected Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 23–39, EM Ltd. v. Republic 
of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-4065); Brief for Petitioner at 
25–53, Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview
/briefs-v3/12-842_pet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 23. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11–
33, Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview
/briefs-v3/12-842_pet_amcu_usa.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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which judgment had not yet been entered.  NML sought and obtained 
an injunction that specifically enforces that Provision by prohibiting 
Argentina from paying what is due on the Exchange Bonds unless it 
also pays what is due under the defaulted bonds.24  The injunction 
thus gave Argentina a choice: pay what it owes under both the 
Exchange Bonds and the defaulted bonds, pay a portion of its 
obligations under both, or pay neither.  The district court stayed the 
injunction pending completion of the appeal. 
On appeal, Argentina again reached to the FSIA.  Argentina 
argued that the injunction operated as an attachment of Argentina’s 
immune property, or as an attachment of property outside the United 
States.  Argentina reasoned that the injunction’s goal was to get 
Argentina to pay its obligations, and therefore it was effectively a 
turnover order equivalent to an attachment.25  The United States, as 
amicus curiae, also contended that the injunction “[c]ontravene[d] the 
[p]urpose and [s]tructure of the FSIA.”26  The Second Circuit rejected 
these arguments, concluding that the injunction “do[es] not operate as 
[an] attachment[] of foreign property prohibited by the FSIA.”27  An 
“attachment,” by its plain terms, requires “a court’s seizure and 
control over specific property,” and the injunction involved no such 
seizure.28  Moreover, the injunction did not grant the same relief as an 
attachment, because it simply provided Argentina with a choice as to 
how to dispose of its property; it did “not require Argentina to pay 
any bondholder any amount of money.”29  The court rejected 
Argentina’s and the United States’ attempts to impose an immunity-
based limitation on the district court’s authority to issue injunctions 
divorced from the FSIA’s specific text, explaining that “the FSIA 
imposes no limits on the equitable powers of a district court that has 
 
 24. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 254–56. 
 25. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 49–53, Equal Treatment Case I, 699 
F.3d 246 (No. 12-105) (“The district court’s expressed rationale for the Permanent 
Injunctions was precisely that they would force the Republic to turn over a material 
portion of its foreign currency reserves to satisfy plaintiffs’ eventual judgments.”). 
 26. See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Reversal at 22–28, Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d 246 (No. 12-105) (“In sum, 
parties cannot avoid the limitations deliberately imposed by Congress on judicial 
execution authority and expand the scope of remedies available to them in an action 
against a sovereign simply by refraining from asking the court to reduce their 
claims to judgment.  There is no indication in the statutory text or history that 
Congress intended for litigants to be able to sidestep sections 1609-1611 by seeking 
an injunction that restrains the sovereign’s use of immune assets until a judgment is 
satisfied, rather than an order of execution against those same assets.”). 
 27. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 262. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 262–63. 
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obtained jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.”30 
The Second Circuit remanded for further clarification of the 
injunction’s payment formula and its effect on third parties involved 
in the payment of Argentina’s exchange bonds,31 which the district 
court soon provided.32  On its return trip to the Second Circuit, 
appealing the clarified injunction, Argentina repeated its already-
rejected FSIA arguments.33  The court of appeals again rebuffed 
Argentina’s immunity arguments, citing its prior opinion and noting 
that, should Argentina choose to pay on the defaulted bonds, “the 
injunctions allow Argentina to pay its [defaulted] debts with 
whatever resources it likes.”34  The court affirmed the injunction in its 
entirety, but continued the stay until the Supreme Court decided 
whether to review the case.  And indeed, after the Second Circuit 
denied Argentina’s petition for rehearing,35 Argentina petitioned the 
Supreme Court for certiorari.36  Argentina’s certiorari petition argued 
that the injunction “coerce[d] [it] into satisfying the debt with assets 
that the FSIA declares immune from enforcement of a money 
judgment,” by putting it to a “‘choice’ between satisfying a monetary 
obligation to [the plaintiffs] and defaulting on $24 billion of 
exchange bond debt.”37  Argentina obtained eight amicus briefs 
supporting its petition, including those from fellow sovereigns 
France, Mexico, and Brazil, as well as Nobel laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz.38 
 
 30. Id. at 263. 
 31. Id. at 250–51, 265. 
 32. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-cv-6978, 2012 WL 
5895786 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). 
 33. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20–26, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic 
of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-105), available at 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Old-Site-
Files/NMLCapitalvArgentina20121228BriefofArgentina.pdf. 
 34. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case II), 727 
F.3d 230, 240–41 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 35. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 
2013) (corrected order denying petition for rehearing), available at 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/Argentine-Sovereign-
Debt/2013/NML-1038.pdf. 
 36. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Equal Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. 2819 
(No. 13-990), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/2014-02-18-Argentina-Petition-for-Certiorari-Final-as-
filed1.pdf. 
 37. Id. at 22–30. 
 38. Brief of the Federative Republic of Brazil as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Equal Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-990); Brief of Joseph 
Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Equal Treatment Case III, 134 
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III. THE DISCOVERY CASE DECISION 
On June 16, 2014, the Supreme Court decided both cases.  In the 
Discovery Case, the Court affirmed on the merits, explaining that the 
FSIA’s text provides the complete set of immunities a foreign 
sovereign may invoke.39  The FSIA was born of Congress’s desire to 
undo the “bedlam” that had arisen from “the old executive-driven, 
factor-intensive, loosely common-law-based immunity regime.”40  
Congress “replac[ed]” that uncertainty with a “comprehensive set of 
legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action 
against a foreign state.”41  The “key word,” the Court emphasized, “is 
comprehensive.”42  The Court noted that it had used that term 
repeatedly before “to describe the Act’s sweep.”43  “Thus,” the Court 
concluded, “any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign 
sovereign in an American court must stand on the Act’s text.  Or it 
must fall.”44 
Argentina’s immunity defense had no moorings in the FSIA’s 
text, and so it fell.  The Court laid out both of the “immunity-
conferring provision[s]” contained in the FSIA—one providing 
immunity from jurisdiction, and one providing immunity from 
attachment.  As Argentina conceded, the Court explained, “[t]here is 
no third provision forbidding or limiting discovery in aid of execution 
of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets.”45  Because “the Act 
says not a word on the subject” of such discovery limits, the Court 
 
S. Ct. 2819  (No. 13-990); Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Republic of Argentina’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Equal 
Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-990); Brief of the United Mexican 
States As Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, Equal 
Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-990). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Caja de Valores, S.A. in Support of Petitioner, Equal Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. 
2819 (No. 13-990); Brief of Amicus Curiae Euroclear Bank SA/NV in Support of 
Petitioner, Equal Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-990); Brief for 
Jubilee USA Network as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Equal Treatment 
Case III, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-990); Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Equal Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-
990).  All are available at: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/republic-of-
argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd. 
 39. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2255–56, 2258. 
 40. Id. at 2255. 
 41. Id. (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 
(1983)). 
 42. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id. at 2255–56 (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493 and Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004)). 
 44. Id. at 2256. 
 45. Id. 
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declined to displace the normal “federal discovery rules” and take up 
Argentina’s suggestion that it craft an atextual immunity defense.46 
The mere fact that NML’s discovery “request is bound to turn 
up information about property that Argentina regards as immune” 
was not a sufficient reason to reject it.47  The Court noted that “the 
reason for these subpoenas is that NML does not yet know what 
property Argentina has and where it is, let alone whether it is 
executable under the relevant jurisdiction’s law,” and the whole point 
of “discovery in postjudgment execution proceedings” is to allow the 
plaintiff to obtain that information.48  Since the FSIA challenge was 
the only argument Argentina properly raised, the Court affirmed the 
discovery order.49 
IV. THE FSIA’S LIMITS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 
On the same day, the Court denied Argentina’s certiorari 
petition in the Equal Treatment Case.  As almost always occurs,50 the 
Court did not explain its reasons for denying the petition.51  Yet, the 
Discovery Case decided the same day provides a clue—and, at least, 
an explanatory rationale.  The central federal issue on which 
Argentina sought certiorari was the same one the Court decided in the 
Discovery Case—whether FSIA conferred an immunity not explicitly 
provided in its text.  In the Discovery Case, the immunity Argentina 
sought was from discovery in aid of attachment; in the Equal 
Treatment Case, the immunity was from an injunction that Argentina 
asserted had the same goal as attachment. 
The Supreme Court rejected all such atextual immunities in the 
Discovery Case.  The Court’s central holding was that “any sort of 
immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court 
must stand on the Act’s text.  Or it must fall.”52  And the FSIA’s text 
provides only “two kinds of immunity”: immunity from jurisdiction 
and immunity from attachment.53  Just as “[t]here is no third 
provision” about discovery in aid of attachment, there is no third 
 
 46. Id. at 2256–57. 
 47. Id. at 2258. 
 48. Id. at 2254, 2257–58. 
 49. Id. at 2255 & n.2, 2258. 
 50. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.5, at 329 (10th 
ed. 2013). 
 51. Equal Treatment Case III, 134 S. Ct. at 2819. 
 52. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2256 (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. 
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provision about injunctions.54  Just as the FSIA says nothing to 
displace the normal “federal discovery rules,”55 so too it says nothing 
to displace Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, governing 
injunctions.  To the contrary, the FSIA provides that where the 
sovereign is not immune from jurisdiction, “the foreign state shall be 
liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances,” forbidding only punitive 
damages.56 
The Court’s decision in the Discovery Case thus closed off any 
possibility for Argentina to prevail on its FSIA argument in the Equal 
Treatment Case.  Even if the Equal Treatment Case had satisfied the 
Supreme Court’s typical criteria for the exercise of certiorari 
jurisdiction—the existence of a Circuit split, a conflict with a 
decision of the Supreme Court, or a federal question of exceptional 
importance57—granting review would have been pointless because 
the result was foreordained by the reasoning of the Discovery Case.  
Nor was a “grant, vacate, and remand” order—a common practice 
when a recent Supreme Court decision could change the outcome of a 
case on petition—appropriate, because after the Discovery Case there 
could be no “reasonable probability” of a different outcome.58  
Rather, the Discovery Case confirmed that the outcome in the Equal 
Treatment Case was correct. 
Where neither of the two immunities found in the FSIA’s text 
applies, the normal rules of substantive contract law govern specific 
performance orders like the injunction NML obtained.  Under these 
principles, parties will be held to their promises—and, indeed, 
ordered to fulfill those promises where certain conditions are met.59  
Specific performance serves important purposes.  As law and 
economics scholars have long noted, “if contractual parties are on 
notice that valid promises will be specifically enforced, they will 
more efficiently exchange reciprocal promises at formation time.”60  
Further, a legal regime where promises are enforceable “promotes 
contract breach only if it is efficient.”61  Moreover, in the event of a 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012). 
 57. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (enumerating and discussing the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ considerations governing review on certiorari). 
 58. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 50, § 5.12(b), at 350 (citation omitted). 
 59. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 261. 
 60. Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified 
Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 365 (1984). 
 61. Id. 
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breach, an enforceable remedy allows for “voluntary negotiations” to 
secure an efficient settlement.62 
The same reasons for enforcing contracts in the general case 
apply in the specific instance of sovereign debt as well.  If countries 
know that investors will have some enforceable remedy in the event 
of default, they will be wary about defaulting, and will do so only if 
economic conditions truly require it.  In the event of default, an 
enforceable remedy encourages sovereigns to settle rather than 
leaving themselves in a state of default until a new set of political 
leaders takes over.  Most importantly, the knowledge that promises 
will be enforceable enables contract formation in the first place.  If 
promises are not enforceable, and investors have nothing to rely on 
but a country’s political will to keep its word, investors will be 
rightly wary of spending their money on what may end up being a 
worthless piece of paper.  Investors may demand higher interest rates, 
or may refuse to lend money at all. 
This concern is particularly acute for countries with lengthy 
histories of default.  If sovereigns that have defaulted repeatedly in 
the past had no way to protect investors against another default, those 
countries may not be able to find willing lenders, or may be able to 
find them only by offering expensive rates of interest.  Sovereign 
bond contracts can provide such a means of ensuring investors—but 
only when they are enforceable.  If there is at least one clause, and 
one jurisdiction that will enforce it, to effectively bind sovereigns, 
then sovereigns who wish to show that they are serious about 
respecting their promises can select that clause and that jurisdiction.63  
A specifically enforceable clause functions as Ulysses’ rope: just as 
Ulysses was able to tie himself to the mast of his ship to prevent 
himself from heeding the inevitable Sirens’ cry, so too sovereigns 
will be able to tie themselves to their promises and avoid the 
temptation of future default.64  A jurisdiction that enforces certain 
 
 62. Id. at 366. 
 63. This is a major benefit of the Second Circuit’s ruling in the Equal Treatment 
Case, as the court itself recognized.  In discussing the public interests advanced by 
the injunction, the court explained that “our decision affirms a proposition essential 
to the integrity of the capital markets: borrowers and lenders may, under New York 
law, negotiate mutually agreeable terms for their transactions, but they will be held 
to those terms.”  Equal Treatment Case II, 727 F.3d at 248.  Thus, “the interest—
one widely shared in the financial community—in maintaining New York’s status 
as one of the foremost commercial centers is advanced by requiring debtors, 
including foreign debtors, to pay their debts.”  Id. 
 64. Other commentators have noted the connection between contract 
enforcement and the Ulysses myth.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral 
Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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promises will thus enable countries to get out from under their own 
torrid histories of default—a result not achievable if sovereign 
immunity barred such enforcement. 
But judicially enforceable remedies are not for everyone.  A 
sovereign, like any other contracting party, has myriad options as to 
what promises it wishes to make; the willingness of another side to 
do business will depend on the contract terms.  Some countries find it 
unnecessary to bind themselves to especially protective terms.  For 
example, Mexico recently issued debt without the same protections 
Argentina provided in the Fiscal Agency Agreement governing the 
defaulted bonds.65  In addition to simply not providing the same 
Equal Treatment language Argentina included, countries can also 
include collective-action clauses that permit sovereigns to modify any 
terms of a contract with the agreement of a supermajority of 
bondholders, thus preventing holdout litigation so long as the 
sovereign offers a reasonable restructuring deal.66 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the FSIA does not limit the availability of injunctive 
relief, sovereigns can entice investors with promises that are 
enforceable through injunctions.  Had Argentina been able to defeat 
the Equal Treatment injunction, its victory would have enabled it to 
avoid its obligations in the short term, but would have hampered the 
ability of countries in the same position to finance their operations in 
the future.  Textually limited sovereign immunity provides 
predictability and options—virtues that benefit not only investors, but 
sovereigns as well. 
 
 
203, 210 (1997) (using Ulysses to illustrate that “opportunities for ex post 
profitable modification may reduce contractors’ ex ante welfare in settings in which 
one party has preferences that vary over the course of the contracting 
relationship.”). 
 65. See Landon Thomas, Mexico’s Bold Move on Debt Restructuring Contracts, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2014, 12:42 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/mexicos-bold-move-on-debt-
restructuring-contracts (discussing bonds  recently issued by Mexico that have new 
collective-action clauses “specifically written to keep holdout investors . . . at 
bay”). 
 66. See, e.g., Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 264; Equal Treatment Case 
II, 727 F.3d at 247–48. 
